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Abstract 
This paper analyses data collected over a nine month period in a simple VoIP honeypot based on simple design 
initially put forward by Usken(2009). The honeypot collected 2083 events of malfeasant activity directed 
towards commonly used VoIP ports. These events resulted in a range of activity being recorded from simple 
enumeration to advanced probing and attempts to compromise the victim honeypot. The analysis involved 
traditional statistics from packet analysis, using customised scripts for extraction of data and graphical analysis 
using i2 Analyst Workstation. The analysis has uncovered an escalation of network activity directed towards the 
honeypot over a nine month period. Initial geographical IP resolutions also see the majority of traffic emanating 
from the Chinese IP space. There is strong evidence to suggest that there is a botnet or worm like malcode being 
directed or developed for VoIP routers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper outlines the investigation into data that has been collected by an ongoing project to develop a Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) based honeypot system. The research already has produced several outcomes 
including simple Snort IDS rules, unique NMAP (Fyodor 1998) operating system fingerprints for commodity 
VoIP routers and some preliminary scripts for topical emulation of a VoIP router administration menu. The 
research has also produced 2083 candidate events that are potentially malfeasant behaviour directed at the 
honeypot over a period of nine months.  
 
This paper is not primarily concerned with the construction of a honeypot rather the analysis of its outcomes. 
The honeypot used in this research itself builds on work by (Usken 2009) in developing simple honeypot 
systems for VoIP. The design of the particular honeypot used in this research was outlined in (Valli and Al-
Lawati 2010). 
 
This paper performs analysis on the 2083 candidate events that were recorded by a actual single honeypot that 
has operated for the duration of the project. The events that were captured for analysis were triggered by any 
connection to commonly known and used TCP and UDP ports for VoIP communication. The resulting 
connection triggered the recording of the event as a network stream in network packet dumps in the commonly 
used tcpdump (MartinGarcia 2010) file format. The resulting packet dumps have been used as the raw data for 
the analysis provided in this paper. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Macro analysis was performed on all of the particular recorded packet dumps which were concatenated into one 
large file for easier analysis and extraction of data. Wireshark (Team 2010) was used for the packet level 
analysis of the concatenated file of packet traces and also the singular packet traces of each recorded event as 
necessitated during the research for the paper.  
 
This concatenated data were subjected to traditional statistical measures, geographical IP resolution and also 
analyzed using the i2 analyst workstation which allows for graphical visualization and query of the data sets. 
The concatenated capture file was read by tcpdump (MartinGarcia 2010) and then pushed through the Afterglow 
(Marty 2010) suite of scripts.  The information extracted included source and destination IP addresses, source 
and destination TCP/UDP ports and packet timestamps enabling time lining of the events. The extracted data 
were then manipulated in a series of Excel spreadsheets, as well as a combination of customised scripts which 
were used to process and extract information for analysis or representation for example converting the 
geographical IP data into a Google Keyhole Markup Language (KML) format file for display in Google Earth. 
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One of the standard measures used by many analysis tools is the top 10 normally by volume or magnitude. The 
following is a table of the top 10 attacking IP addresses. 
 
IP Count Country 
121.14.149.145 60 China 
60.190.173.30 47 China 
117.41.168.235 45 China 
117.41.228.243 36 China 
113.105.152.220 27 China 
121.14.139.34 27 China 
121.14.149.175 27 China 
121.12.127.168 26 China 
119.147.116.249 25 Unknown 
117.41.229.74 24 China 
Table 1: Top 10 Attacking IPs 
 
The details presented in the table are valid but of little investigative value for most forensic purposes, however 
they are descriptive and can be used to start a line of analysis or inquiry. The nature of the Internet is such that an 
attacking endpoint can be singular i.e an IP address or multiple addresses typically from a subnet. The important 
thing to consider in a forensic analysis of this type is the network endpoint from which the attack emanated or 
was routed from. The endpoint in the case of compromised networks is the border router for a particular subnet 
or single real IP. Using this approach this significantly changes the view of the attack epochs. When this logic of 
border is then applied further to the dataset as geo-located IP addresses a different pattern emerges. The raw data 
was also subjected to geographical IP query using a customised script and querying a geolocation to IP database.  
The following table lists the top 10 entries at a level of Country of origin resolution. 
 
Country IP  
China 1041 63.7% 
Unknown/Unassigned 273 16.7% 
 USA 120 7.3% 
 India 28 1.7% 
 Vietnam 27 1.7% 
 Taiwan 20 1.2% 
 Korea 16 1.0% 
Indonesia 13 0.8% 
 Russia 13 0.8% 
 Malaysia 11 0.7% 
Table 2: Top 10 Attacking IPs by Country 
 
The second largest item Unknown was composed of either IP numbers that did not result in a resolution in the 
geographical IP databases as it was unknown or was a spoofed unassigned IP number. The majority of 
malfeasant traffic at this stage has originated from IP spaces from the Chinese mainland, this is concurrent with 
observations from other Australian honeypots (Reardon 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further drilling down with the geographical IP databases for the top ten cities produces the following table of 
results from the dataset. 
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Province City Country 
Guangzhou  Guangdong  CN 326 
Beijing  Beijing  CN 308 
Dongguan  Guangdong  CN 152 
Zhengzhou  Henan  CN 78 
Huzhou  Zhejiang  CN 47 
Shanghai  Shanghai  CN 23 
Hangzhou  Zhejiang  CN 19 
Wuhan  Hubei  CN 13 
Changsha  Hunan  CN 12 
Nanning  Guangxi  CN 10 
Table 3: Top 10 Attacking IPs by City 
 
It is interesting to note that the Guangdong province accounts for almost 50% of China's attributable traffic with 
478 events. Also the top three cities within this table with 786 events comprise just under 25% of all events that 
were logged by the honeypot. The traffic from these regions has been consistent and persistent in probing the 
honeypot. 
 
Individual micro analysis was performed on candidate events of interest to determine where possible the type of 
attack or behaviour that was evinced in the execution of that event. The classification is based on the SIP Info 
and the User-agent details contained within the packets sent to the honeypot. The signatures and handshakes are 
provided in the Table 4 below.  
  
Scanner (SIP Info) Events User-agent 
asterisk 700 Asterix PBX 
asterisk 419  
sipsscuser 423 sundayddr 
sipvicious 331 friendly-scanner 
Asterisk 7 friendly-scanner 
Table 4: Event Fingerprint/Signature data 
 
The sipvicious(Guac 2010) signatures examined are consistent with use of a default configured sipvicious 
scanner to enumerate the honeypot. The actual packet traces produced by these particular events are also 
consistent with default scanning modes provided by the sipvicious tool in duration and magnitude. 
 
The sipsscuser signature based activity detected in the honeypot is interesting and started being recorded on the 
honeypot on 8 July 2010 and also was the last event extracted from the dataset which occurred on 17 November 
2010. The attack profile this particular signature is generating is best described as a persistent threat. The modus 
operandi displayed by this particular event signature would also indicate similar worm or botnet like activity as 
detected by Reardon, 2010. The signature provided by this candidate indicates that it is potentially a modified 
sipvicious scanner or one using the same initial code base.  
 
Sipvicious Modified sipsscuser 
From:"sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1>; 
tag=63626131373537653133633401333135363739323
63136 
Accept: application/sdp 
User-Agent: friendly-scanner 
To: "sipvicious"<sip:100@1.1.1.1> 
Contact: sip:100@127.0.0.1:5064 
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS 
Call-ID: 532778670076825915635622 
Max-Forwards: 70 
From:"sipsscuser"<sip:100@192.168.1.9>; 
tag=665879545572395724923248927313319215039211
04449 
Accept: application/sdp 
User-Agent: sundayddr 
To: "sipssc"<sip:100@192.168.1.9> 
Contact: sip:100@192.168.1.9:5060 
CSeq: 1 OPTIONS 
Call-ID: 212163834799713241150823794 
Max-Forwards: 70 
Table 5 - Comparision of sipvicious and sipsscuser 
The range of hosts using this tool or piece of code is extensive. The other interesting pattern to note is attributed 
hosts using this code propagate less than 5 probe events against the honeypot before disappearing. The 
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geographical origin of this attack profile indicates 82% are coming from host IP addresses originating from the 
Chinese mainland. 
 
This mode of attack is in stark contrast to some of the concerted efforts by the single attacking hosts or subnets 
seen elsewhere in the dataset. This event signature also signals an escalation of attack complexity from 
traditional script kiddies who use a tool in default mode to the same attacker trialling or developing new tools or 
malware. This modus operandii indicates a botnet or some automata for compromise and control of scanning IP. 
In an online article Reardon (2010) mentions a plausible scenario for propagation of modified VoIP targeted 
malware via a botnet of victims via SSH compromise and push of payload to the victim computers. The data 
from this research also supports Reardon's suggested modus operandii. 
 
The analysis undertaken with i2 analyst notebook was exploratory in nature and looked to identify emergent 
patterns or inconsistency in events through graphical visualisation and analysis of the data. The visualisation of 
data clearly indicated that the VoIP honeypot was successfully compromised by attackers. The following figure 
is a snapshot from this graphical analysis  
 
Figure 1:  i2 workstation analysis 
 
Upon trace analysis it was determined that there was successful compromise of the emulated VoIP system. The 
successful compromise of the honeypot saw attackers utilise it to attack another honeypot device within the same 
physical network subnet. The activity was such that it used four current hosts (circled on image) that the attacker 
controlled and scanned the next viable target IP in the honeypots subnet. When the scans determined that the 
newly targeted host was potentially vulnerable to compromise it changed attack vector. The change in attack 
vector was an attempt to obfuscate their malicious activity as further directed attack against the newly identified 
victim was from an IP address external to the honeypot subnet. In addition to being external the IP was one not 
previously used in the widespread attack of the honeypot at that point in time. This particular successful 
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compromise indicates an increasing maturity of the attacks perpetrated against VoIP systems known to be 
vulnerable.  
KNOWLEDGE, OPPORTUNITY AND MOTIVATION? 
The honeypot in this research is basically designed to mimic a domestic VoIP implementation that a standard 
home user may actually be using. Any crime that is commissioned normally contains three essential hallmarks: 
knowledge, opportunity and motive. An analysis of these can often aid in the remediation or elimination of the 
crime.  
 
The analysis of data clearly indicates an escalation in the exploitation attempts targeting VoIP installations. The 
data, analysis and subsequent evidence clearly indicate that the attackers have knowledge specific to how VoIP 
is deployed, probed and attacked. There is also clear evidence that their knowledge is growing through 
development of complex attack methods utilising advanced network exploitation techniques.  
 
As to opportunity, the attackers are exploiting the opportunity afforded to them by the Internet to compromise 
VoIP implementations that are sitting on relatively insecure default devices. Further opportunity is expanded as 
detection of malfeasant activity on home systems is negligible due to the naive or novice nature of the home or 
small business user.  
 
Motivation beyond the criminal intent in this current scenario however is much harder to determine. Large 
commercial VoIP systems typically have a corresponding large amount of bandwidth on which to send data. It is 
therefore easier to hide malfeasant activity in a larger volume of data. In essence, a salami attack or slicing of 
this bandwidth can be used to accommodate extra VoIP traffic which would evade detection as long the footprint 
was comparatively small as compared to the overall size of the connection. The same corresponding attack on a 
relatively low bandwidth home-based installation however will in all probability be detected. The detection 
however may not be as a result of observed degradation of service but via an alternate channel, which is at the 
next pay period for the Internet or VoIP service. This detection will be possibly as a result of the stolen 
bandwidth potentially causing an increase in service charge or traffic volume due to the relative size of Internet 
installation. In addition, there can also be telephony charges associated with the service which again due to the 
relative low volumes in a household or small business with any significant increase would be easily apparent. 
Also in the case of the home user they tend to dial a restricted set or known numbers and again matched against 
the billing may alert the end user to malfeasant activity. 
 
Victims compromised by the use of the identified botnet mechanism may not be in fact targeted for financial 
gain directly through the theft of telephony as the key motivating factor. Financial gain may instead be garnered 
as a result of directed distributed denial of service (DDoS) of a third party. The motivation is a sustained DDoS 
of corporate entities that have critical business exposure on the Internet as a result of service dependencies. The 
dependencies directly relates to service availability that is one of the core elements for business success and 
sustainability for example online gambling or online banking. These particular types of network dependent 
businesses are the targets and consequently enable the primary motivation for compromise of a home or small 
business users VoIP system.  
 
Furthermore, the control of a large range of victim hosts also has the unfortunate plausible scenario that these 
telephony devices are used to flood the public switched telephone network with calls in the case of an emergency 
or a physical attack such as a terrorist incident. This scenario is plausible as the VoIP service on the 
compromised hosts could be made to make simultaneous and repeated calls to a particular telephone or 
telephone exchange. Another plausible explanation for motivation is for snooping in on voice communications 
that are being carried or transmitted through these VoIP routers this could be for a variety of reasons including 
intelligence gathering or industrial espionage. 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This paper is an analysis of one data set taken from this single ADSL based honeypot. The next analysis will be 
a combination of data taken from various honeypots within the Australian context. This combined analysis will 
allow correlation of events across a wider network space and also time continuum. Furthermore, the extended 
dataset will allow for a more in-depth analysis relating to traffic patterns, distribution methods and modus 
operandi of any botnet or targeted network borne malware that is being used. 
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There is a definite need to conduct research into this area because unlike other areas of Internet malfeasance this 
can have significant and direct financial gain for the perpetrator of the attack through theft of service. Unlike 
many other network borne attacks these may in fact be also readily directed at national critical infrastructure in 
the form of the telecommunications networks to cause denial of service.  
 
There needs to be research conducted into the methods of targeting in use. This will allow researchers to 
determine if the compromises that are appearing are totally automated or in fact have human actors. It is 
indicated from the data in this study and also from Reardon (2010), that there is development of automated 
attacks being undertaken. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research has uncovered significant patterns of attack that are being directed against VoIP systems. The 
magnitude of attacks perpetrated is across the full range from simple opportunistic scanning through to full 
penetration and compromise of a VoIP honeypot. This research also strongly supports other indications of an 
escalation of attacks from systems located within the Chinese IP spaces with almost 70% of attacks being 
directly attributable.  
 
The analysis indicates an escalation of attack complexity and sophistication being used. At this stage however, 
targeting of hosts seems very opportunistic and not discriminatory. Indications are also that the level of attack is 
reaching a persistent level with several significant attacks per day being experienced by the honeypot. 
Motivations for escalation of attack on this type of device are also questionable and warrant significant 
investigation. 
 
Further research is desperately needed to ameliorate the significant threat to this current activity poses to VoIP 
systems and overall network stability for both the Internet and standard telephony-based services. 
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